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Introduction 
Accounts of a covert FBI investigation of the Chicago 
Futures Exchanges began appearing in the press in late January 
1989. For the past two years FBI agents have been posing as 
brokers at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME). The agents have infiltrated the 
soybean and Treasury bond pits at the CBOT, and the S&P 500, 
Japanese yen, and Swiss franc pits at the CME in an attempt to 
discover whether trading rules are being violated. More than 100 
persons at the CME are currently being investigated. 1 As of this 
date, however, no indictments have been filed by authorities. 
various allegations concerning rules violations have been 
made. They range from IIbucketing ll to IIfront-running ll and 
include noncompetitive trading, trading after the bell, and 
sloppy trades. Even the open outcry system itself is being 
investigated for encouraging violations. 2 Since the main focus 
of the current investigation is on trading rules violations, 
proposed reforms will no doubt contain suggested rules 
modifications. The CME is already revising the structure of its 
rules and plans to implement the changes immediately.3 
1McMurray, Scott. IIChicago Probe Involves List Of 125 At 
Merc. 1I Wall Street Journal. 2 March 1989, sec. A:3. 
2See Appendix 1 for a discussion of these violations. 
3McMurray, Scott. IIChicago Merc Plans Tougher Rules' 
Debut. II Wall Street Journal. 18 April 1989, sec. C:1. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the effect of the 
trading rules on the transaction costs in these markets and to 
compare transaction costs across markets that employ different 
types of trading rules. 
2 
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Rules On The spot And Futures Markets 
History Of The Exchanges 
In 1848, the Chicago Board of Trade was founded by 82 
chicago merchants. Their intention was to standardize the weight 
system, inspect the grains and provide an official exchange in 
the city that had become a natural crossroad for farmers. with 
the intention of creating a continuous market, "to arrive" 
contracts were developed. As trade volume increased, farmers 
wanted a guarantee that they could continue trading and that 
their products could always be bought or sold at some later date. 
In this way "to arrive" contracts were created as the first form 
of futures, assuring farmers of the future purchase or delivery 
of their crops.4 Today the Chicago Board of Trade is the 
world's largest futures exchange. Last year it traded twenty-six 
futures and futures options with an average daily volume of 2.4 
million and a contract volume of 118 million. 5 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange was founded in 1919 as the 
Chicago Butter and Egg Exchange. Today it is the second-largest 
futures exchange, trading thirty futures and futures options. In 
1988 it had a contract volume of 78 million, averaging 400,000 
per day.6 
4options On Agricultural Futures. 2nd ed. Board of Trade 
of the City of Chicago. 1986. p. 5. 
5Siler, Julia Flynn. "At Chicago Boards, Styles Differ." 
New York Times. 21 Feb. 1989. p. 34. 
6I bid. 
-The New York stock Exchange (NYSE) was officially organized 
on May 17, 1792, when twenty-four men signed a stock exchange 
agreement. Their positions evolved from the need to facilitate 
security speculation after the First Bank of the United states 
began issuing stocks. 7 
The exchanges have become sophisticated and complex 
4 
organizations since their inception nearly 150 and 200 years ago. 
They are heavily policed and regulated by the their own law 
making bodies and the u.s. Government itself. The structure of 
the law making bodies of these markets is slightly different. 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange is composed of a thirty-one 
member board with twenty-five, or eighty-one percent, of these 
- board members being members who trade on the exchange. The 
-
Chicago Board of Trade's twenty-four member board has twenty-one, 
or eighty-eight percent, insiders. While of the twenty-seven 
member board on the New York stock Exchange, only fifteen, or 
fifty-six percent, trade on the exchange. 8 
The composition of the rules may favor more lenient trading 
regulation than on the NYSE. The futures market is not as 
heavily influenced by government regulation as is the NYSE which 
may influence the reform proposals that follow the FBI 
investigation. Traders on the CBOT and CME, responding to a Wall 
street Journal survey concerning trading violations, acknowledged 
7Meeker, J. Edward. The Work Of The stock Exchange. New 
York: The Ronald Press Co. 1922. pp. 28-29. 
8s iler, Julia Flynn. "Two Trading Practices Could Bring 
u.s. Prosecution." New York Times. 15 Feb. 1989. 
-5 
that violations occur. They felt that outdated rules on the CBOT 
and CME encouraged these violations. 9 Because of the rapid 
growth in the markets, the rules are not equipped to cover all 
transactions. 
The differences in rules include the open-outcry system 
versus the specialist. Computerized trading is currently not 
used on the futures markets as it is on the New York spot market. 
No prearranged trading is allowed on the Chicago futures market, 
neither is block trading permitted. A futures broker can, 
however, trade for his own account after he has first completed a 
customer's transaction. 
contrasting with the New York stock Exchange, no "uptick" 
-- rule exists in the futures market. The uptick rule prevents a 
broker from entering a short position when the trading price is 
falling. In contrast to the New York stock Exchange, an offer or 
bid is only binding as it is being announced on the commodity 
exchanges. 10 
Each exchange has an extensive set of rules. For example, 
the rule book for the Chicago Board of Trade is hundreds of pages 
in length, contains twenty-four chapters with 1,190 rules. The 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange is governed by sixty-three chapters 
averaging ten pages in length. It contains separate chapters 
9Koten, John. "Violations Widespread At Merc, Survey 
Finds." Wall Street Journal. 18 April 1989, sec. C: 1. 
10U. S • Government. Report Of The Presidential Task Force On 
Market Mechanisms. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 1988. sec. VI, p. 20. 
-addressing solely the enforcement of rules, trading practices, 
and arbitration. There are 791 rules governing the New York 
stock Exchange, with most rules being at least a page in length. 
Each exchange enforces its rules and disciplines 
infractions. A rules violation on the New York stock Exchange 
may result in suspension, expulsion, cancellation of 
6 
registration, or a fine of up to $25,000 for an individual or 
$100,000 for an organization. 11 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
may, by majority vote of a hearing committee, impose probation, 
impose a fine not in excess of $50,000, suspend a member for less 
than seven months, or terminate their registration. 12 
A similar process takes place at the Chicago Board of Trade. 
Members may be suspended, expelled, or fined. The maximum fine 
that may be imposed for anyone violation is $5,000 by majority 
vote of the hearing committee, up to a maximum of $12,500 for all 
fines. A stiffer aggregate fine of up to $50,000 may be imposed 
by a two-thirds vote. 13 The fines imposed last year for insider 
trading in New York and the current fines and penalties being 
imposed in Chicago are evidence that these rules are actually 
enforced and not simply listed as formality. 
11New York stock Exchange Constitution And Rules. Chicago: 
Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1982. p. 4058. 
12Consolidated Rules Of The Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
June 1988. ch. 4, p. 18. 
13Board Of Trade Of The city Of Chicago Rules And 
Regulations. 1982. p. 516. 
7 
Appendix 3 contains a list of the trading practices for the 
Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
because these are the rules allegedly being violated and the ones 
traders seem to bypass for further financial gain. various rules 
from the New York stock Exchange have been listed which are 
similar to the rules on the futures Exchanges. Explanations and 
paraphrasing have been given for the rules most closely related 
to the violations and the paper. The rule books themselves 
provide a detailed explanation of each. 
-8 
Why The Rules Are Important 
Trading rules standardize the contract between the principal 
and agent. The rules outline how a transaction is to occur once 
a decision to buy or sell has been made--the channels it must go 
through, the people involved, and the fees charged. Rules 
specify the relationship between the traders. They delineate 
what each party can expect from entering into the transaction. 
standardized trading practices reduce the cost of trading. 
Guarantee of transaction is one of the main features of an 
organized exchange. 14 Trading rules ensure this. For example, 
buyers do not have to be concerned that the seller has legitimate 
title to the item traded. The seller need not be concerned about 
the purchaser's ability to pay, because the transaction is 
guaranteed by the exchange itself and enforced by the exchange 
authorities. 
Transaction costs are also reduced by the rules that 
standardize the item traded. For example if customers allow 
brokers to trade for them and do not require examination of the 
goods beforehand, transaction costs are lowered. 15 
Trading rules are important because they specifically 
outline the procedures to be followed in carrying out the 
transaction. Parties are not left to fill their orders by their 
own means. Rules govern the exact steps all the parties in the 
14Hirshleifer, Jack. Price Theory And Applications. 3rd ed. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1984. 
15Demsetz, Harold. "The Cost Of Transacting." Quarterly 
Journal Of Economics. 82(1968): 50. 
.-
transaction must follow. In the futures market, they describe 
the actions of the pit and open-outcry system. Rules determine 
the distribution of the proceeds of the trade. In the New York 
spot market, the rules outline the procedures of the brokers and 
specialists; they govern the bid-ask spread and at what price 
orders must be filled. 
9 
Rules lower transactions costs for buyers and sellers. Of 
course, the mere existence of a trading rule does not insure that 
transaction costs are lowered. In fact, some trading rules may 
raise these costs. However, since buyers and sellers are always 
free to engage in direct exchange, they will only employ the 
services of an organized exchange if doing so results in lower 
transaction costs . 
-10 
Some Discussion of the Transaction Costs 
In the case of stock trades, transaction costs can be 
defined as the cost of exchanging ownership titles to stock 
shares and money. 16 Brokerage fees and bid-ask spreads make up 
the majority of these transaction costs. 17 Brokers fees are the 
commission charges paid for executing buys and sells. 
The bid-ask spread is more complex than straight commission 
fees. The spread is the difference in the price that the buyer 
pays and seller receives. Roughly, this spread is the 
specialist's compensation, whose job is to continually maintain 
the market in the stock. 18 The specialist must hold stocks in 
inventory until someone wants to buy or sell them. This puts his 
capital at risk since the inventory may be maintained for 
relatively long periods of time. 
specialists maintain a market for buyers and sellers. 
Specialists profit from this activity by filling customers' 
orders at a cost lower than the cost of direct exchange between 
buyers and sellers. 
The following diagram illustrates the role the specialist 
plays in reducing transaction costs. Assume that S' is the 
supply curve associated with direct exchange. The curve includes 
16Demsetz, Harold. "The Cost Of Transacting." Quarterly 
Journal Of Economics. 82(1968): 35. 
ed. 
17Hirshleifer, Jack. Price Theorv And Applications. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1984. 
18I bid. 
3rd 
p. 421. 
--
-
the cost of transacting. The quantity exchanged is QO. Sellers 
supply that quantity at Ps and buyers purchase that quantity 
at P B. 
Using a specialist, or any other middleman, reduces the 
11 
transaction cost. This lowers the supply curve WŬŸĦĚ The 
result is a greater quantity exchanged, Ql. At the same time, 
the price received by sellers rises to PS' and the price paid by 
buyers falls to PB'. 
Price of Q 
P' B 
D 
Quantitv Exchanged 
--
12 
Use of the middleman benefits both parties to the exchange. 
Buyers pay a lower price. Their gain is represented by the area 
PBPBBC' Sellers receive a higher price. Their gain is 
represented by the area PSPSAD. 
The effect of using a specialist on the NYSE has been to 
increase the gain to buyers by decreasing the price per stock 
transaction that they must pay, while at the same time increase 
the gain to sellers by increasing the price per stock transaction 
that they receive. This illustrates the Fundamental Theorem of 
Exchange--that trade is mutually beneficial for all parties in 
the exchange. 19 
Middlemen services will only be used as long as the 
transaction cost of using the middleman is lower than the 
transaction cost of buyers and sellers trading directly. The 
lower the transaction costs, the greater the volume exchanged and 
the greater the demand for the middleman. Point A on the diagram 
represents the bid price that the specialist offers and point B 
reflects the asked price. The line AB approximates the 
transaction cost per unit exchanged. If the bid-ask spread, P B'-
Pst, approached or became larger than the original distance P -P 
B S 
there would be no demand for the specialist. 
While the cost of transacting through a specialist may be 
lower than direct exchange, there is no guarantee that this is 
the actual cost incurred by the specialist. This results from 
19Hirshleifer, Jack. Price Theory And Applications. 3rd 
ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1984. 
pp. 218-22. 
--
the rule that permits only one specialist to trade each 
security. 20 Furthermore, the information contained in the 
specialist1s book of limit orders is not generally available to 
market participants. 
13 
This special information and the lack of direct competition 
may result in a bid-ask spread that contains economic rents in 
addition to transaction costs. 21 Diagrammatically, the height of 
AB may represent the sum of the specialists cost of executing 
transactions and economic rent. Unless the specialist faces 
strong competition from brokers who trade among themselves, for 
example, there is no assurance that the transaction costs equal 
the bid-ask spreads. 
Competition limits monopoly power, however. This moves the 
bid-ask spread closer to the actual transaction costs. 
Depending upon the degree of competition, the gains to buyers and 
sellers are increased if the specialist faces stiffer 
competition. Such competition limits his ability to exercise 
monopoly power. 
While these factors are important, the degree of competition 
among traders in the futures market would seem to be greater than 
among specialists at the New York Stock Exchange. For example, 
there are no specialists in Chicago. No single person maintains 
an order book for each commodity. No limit to the number of 
20Demsetz, Harold. liThe Cost Of Transacting. 1I Quarterly 
Journal of Economics. 82(1968): 35. 
21I bid. pp. 42-44. 
14 
order books exists. All trades are made using the open-outcry 
system, whereby each broker must fill his buy or sell order by 
yelling or using signals before the entire pit. This permits 
other brokers, upon hearing a desired price, to accept the price 
immediately. Whereas on the NYSE, a member may not be able to 
immediately fill his order at the price he desires, given the 
bid-ask spread of the specialist. He may have to fill his order 
a portion at a time at different prices as the price approaches 
his desired price. 22 
Seat prices which allow brokers to trade on these exchanges, 
like stocks and commodities, are competitively determined. Any 
rents that are earned will be reflected in the price of the 
seats. To compare the extent of competition commodities brokers 
face to the competition specialists on the NYSE face, an 
examination of their membership costs would indicate which 
markets face more extensive competition or receive more economic 
rent. 
22santoni, G.J. "The October Crash: Some Evidence On The 
Cascade Theory." Review. Federal Bank Of st. Louis. May/June 
1988. pp.25-26. 
15 
seat Prices and Trading Volume 
seat Prices 
The last full membership sold on the Chicago Board of Trade 
at a price of $420,500. 23 This membership allows the holder to 
trade anything listed on the exchange. The same membership on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange sells for approximately 
$480,000. 24 A seat on the New York Stock Exchange sells for 
nearly $200,000 more. One sold for $620,000 in late December 
1988. 25 To become a specialist on the NYSE a person must not 
only be a member of the exchange but he must also pass rigorous 
tests and hold one million dollars in capital. This is in 
addition to purchasing the membership seat. 
These prices are the discounted value of expected future 
income flows. The expected value appears to be higher in New 
York, indicated by the 1.6 million dollars required to become a 
specialist as compared to the roughly $450,000 required to become 
a commodities broker. Economics rents may account for the 
difference. Furthermore, it is well documented that the 
transaction costs of trading equivalent baskets of stock are 
higher in the spot market than in the futures market. 
2311chicago Board Of Trade Seat Is Sold." Wall Street 
Journal. 12 April 1989, sec. C:12. 
24Appendix 2 lists the types of membership and 1988 prices 
for these memberships on the Chicago Board of Trade and the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
2511Big Board Seat Price Declines." Wall Street Journal. 22 
Dec. 1988, sec. C: 16. 
Trading Volume 
A comparison of the growth in trading volume on the 
commodity exchanges to the NYSE can be used as an indicator of 
transaction costs. If transaction costs were high in a 
particular market, then one would expect the trading volume in 
that market to be low or declining relative to a market with 
lower transaction costs. 
16 
Appendix 4 lists the yearly trading volume, a statistical 
comparison and a graph of the trading volume over time for the 
commodity exchanges and the New York stock Exchange. The volume 
of financial instruments and currencies traded on the commodity 
exchanges has also been listed. Financial instruments are an 
especially important indicator because they include the S & P 500 
futures contract traded on the CME. Trading the S & P 500 
futures contract is a SUbstitute for trading the equivalent 
basket of stocks on the NYSE. The sample period begins in 1977. 
Financial futures contracts were first traded in 1975, and their 
growth rate is exceptionally high the first two years given the 
small starting base. 
Comparing the average annual percentage growth rates in 
trading volume, it is apparent that trading in financial futures 
has grown much more rapidly than trading on the NYSE. The 
average annual growth rate for financial instruments is 60% with 
the currencies futures growing at a rate of 45.7%. The average 
annual growth rate in volume on the NYSE has only been 18%. 
Note the inverse correlation between growth in financial futures 
17 
trading and trading volume on the NYSE. This is consistent with 
the notion that the two markets offer competing (substitute) 
products. 
Summary 
Effective trading rules lower transaction costs for buyers 
and sellers, eliminating their need to engage in direct exchange. 
The theory and data in this paper support the idea that 
transaction costs are lower on the Chicago futures exchanges than 
on the New York stock Exchange. Indicative of this are the 
much higher growth rates on the commodities market relative to 
the NYSE. 
Rules governing these exchanges directly and indirectly 
establish what the transaction costs will be. The NYSE uses a 
specialist as a middleman. The CBOT and CME use the open-outcry 
method of exchange, bypassing the middleman. The rules govern 
the actions and responsibilities of these trading members. 
Depending upon the type of rules employed, transaction costs can 
be lowered. While a few may abuse the rules, they are written 
to encourage trade among buyers and sellers. The FBI 
investigation will no doubt produce rule reforms on these 
exchanges in an attempt to make the markets more efficient, while 
at the same time reducing the incentive for violations and 
improving policing abilities. 
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APPENDIX 1 
TRADING VIOLATIONS 
Taking the opposite side of a customer. 
20 
Instead of executing the customer's trade on the 
open market, a brokerage firm secretly takes a 
position opposite of the customer. 
Trading for oneself in advance of customer order. 
Before executing a customer's order, a broker 
trades for himself first, executes the customer's 
order, then sells after the price has risen. 
Noncompetitive Trading 
Trading before large customer orders are filled 
to take advantage of the order's impact on the 
market. 
Trading After the Bell 
Making a trade outside of official trading hours. 
Sloppy Trades Not executing a customer's order when the market 
reaches the requested price. 
Open outcry System 
Traders and locals form close relationships such 
that they start trading among themselves and not 
with the whole pit. 
These trading violation are discussed in the New York Times (2-
15-89) and in the Wall Street Journal (3-14-89). 
APPENDIX 2 
SEAT PRICES BASED UPON TYPE OF MEMBERSHIP 
Chicago Board of Trade 
--Full Membership: $400,000. Can trade any futures or options 
on the exchange. 1,402 memberships. 
21 
--Associate Membership: $215,000. Can trade financial futures, 
precious metals, and all futures' options. 722 memberships. 
--Membership Interests: 
-Limited Government Instrument Markets: $245,000. Can 
trade bond and treasury futures. 245 memberships. 
-Index pit and Energy Market: $30,000. Can trade in the 
Major Market Index and the Chicago Board of Exchange. 565 
memberships. 
-Commodity options Market: $87,000. Can trade only futures 
options. 583 memberships. 
-Evening trading permits: $180,000. Can trade Treasury 
note bonds, bond futures and options, 10-year Treasury note 
futures and options, 100-ounce gold futures, and S,OOO-ounce 
silver futures. 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
--Full Membership: $480,000. Can trade any futures or options 
listed on the exchange. 625 memberships. 
--International Monetary Market: $347,500. Can trade currency 
and interest rate futures. 812 memberships. 
--Index and options Market: $124,000. Can trade stock-index 
futures, random length lumber and all futures' options. 1,287 
memberships. 
This information was reprinted in the Muncie star from the 
Chicago Tribune 2-12-89. 
APPENDIX 3 
TRADING RULES 
22 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Trading Practices 
520. 
521. 
522. 
523. 
524. 
525. 
526. 
527. 
528. 
529. 
530. 
531. 
532. 
533. 
534. 
535. 
536. 
537. 
538 
539. 
Trading Confined To Exchange Floor. 
pit Trading--AII transactions, including spread 
transactions, shall be by open outcry in the 
established pit for that commodity. 
Board Trading. 
Acceptance of Offers and Bids. 
Responsibility For Trades. 
Confirmation Of Trades. 
Errors Discovered During Trading Session. 
Errors Discovered After A Trading Session. 
Change In Last Sale Price. 
Withholding Orders Prohibited. 
Priority Of Customers' Orders. 
Trading Against Customers' Order Prohibited--A member 
having in hand a customer order shall not knowingly 
enter into a transaction on behalf of that customer in 
which the member assumes the opposite side. 
Disclosing Orders Prohibited--A member shall not disclose 
another person's order to buy or sell, except to an 
officer of the market or CFTC. Violation of this rule 
is a major offense. 
Simultaneous Buying And Selling Orders For Different 
Principals Executed By One Trader. 
Simultaneous Buying And Selling Orders For The Same 
Principals Prohibited. 
Responsibility Of Traders And Brokers. 
Records For Orders And Personal Transactions. 
Confirmations To Customers. 
Transfer Of spot For Futures. 
Pre-Arranged Trades Prohibited--A member shall not make any 
purchase or sale which has been pre-arranged except a 
transfer of spot for futures. 
540. Liability On Limit Orders. 
541. Trading Restrictions Respecting The S&P 500 Stock Price 
Index Futures Contract. 
542. Simultaneous Spread Transactions. 
--
-
543. 
544. 
545. 
546. 
547. 
548. 
Bona Fide Hedging, Arbitrage And Intercommodity Spread 
positions. 
Closing Day Orders. 
closing Bid And Offers In Blackboard Trading. 
Opening And Closing Ranges. 
Discretionary Orders. 
Priority Of Execution. 
This is the complete list of "Trading Practices" as listed in 
Chapter 5 of the Consolidated Rules of The Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange. 
• 23 
--
24 
Chicago Board Of Trade 
Trading Practices 
330.00 
331. 01 
331. 02 
1. 
2. 
3 • 
4. 
332.00 
332.01 
332.01A 
332.01B 
332.02 
332.03 
333.00 
335.00 
336.00 
337.01 
350.00 
350.01 
350.02 
350.03 
350.04 
350.05 
Floor Brokers 
Price of Execution Binding 
Acceptable Orders 
Market orders to buy or sell 
Closing order to buy or sell 
Limit order to buy or sell 
stop order to buy or sell 
Orders Must Be Executed in The Public Market--all orders 
received by members must be executed competitively by 
open outcry in the open market. 
Open Market Execution Requirement 
Bidding and Offering Practices 
Conformation with section 1.39 of The Commodity Exchange 
Act 
Trade Data 
Lost Orders 
Trades of Non-Clearing Members 
Bids and Offers in Commodities Subject to First 
Acceptance 
Bids and Offers in Commodities Subject to Partial 
Acceptance 
Orders and Cancellations Accepted on A 'Not Held" Basis 
Trade Checking Penalties 
Failure to Check Trades 
Checking and Reporting Trades 
Identification of Floor Trading Personnel and Floor 
Traders 
Errors and Mishandling of Orders 
Floor Practices--The following acts are detrimental to 
the welfare of the Association 
a) for a floor broker to purchase any commodity for 
future delivery for his own account, while holding an 
order of another person for the purchase of the same 
commodity. 
b) for a broker to sell any commodity for future 
delivery for his own account, while holding an order of 
another person for the sale of the same commodity. 
c) for a floor broker to execute any transaction for 
any account of another person without the prior 
specific consent of the account owner. 
--
-
350.06 
350.07 
350.08 
352.01 
352.01A 
25 
d) for a member to disclose at any time that he is 
holding an order of another person or from divulging 
any order revealed to him by reason of his relationship 
to such other person. 
e) for a member to take, directly or indirectly, the 
other side of any order of another person revealed to 
him by reason of his relationship to such other person, 
except with such other person's prior consent and in 
conformity with Exchange rules. 
f) for a member to make any purchase or sale which has 
been pre-arranged. 
g) for a member to withhold or withdraw from, the 
market any order or part of any order of another person 
for the convenience of another member. 
h) for a member to execute any order after the closing 
bell is sounded except in a call market close. 
i} for a member to buy and sell as an accommodation at 
any time or to use one order to fill another order. 
j} for parties to a transaction to fail to properly 
notify the pit recorder of the price at which trades 
have been consummated. 
k) for a floor broker to allocate executions of orders 
in any manner other than an equitable manner. 
Give-Ups 
Confirming and Recording Trades 
Notification of Unchecked Trades 
Spreading Transactions 
Spreading Transactions 
This is the complete list of "Floor Practices" as listed in 
Chapter Three of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago Rules 
and Regulations. 
--
New York Stack Exchange 
Rule 435. 
Miscellaneous Prohibitions 
Excessive Trading by Members 
Successive Transactions by Members 
No member shall execute or cause to be executed on the 
Exchange the purchases or sale of any security at 
successively higher or lower prices for the purpose of 
creating misleading activity in a security, or improperly 
influencing the market price of the security. 
Manipulative Operations 
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No member shall participate in manipulating for the purpose 
of unfairly influencing the market price for the purpose of 
making a profit. 
Circulation of Rumors 
Reopening a Contract 
Loans for Account of Non-Members 
Dealings upon the Exchange 
Rule: 
51. Hours for business 
52. Dealings on Floor--Hours 
Dealings shall be limited to the hours during which the 
Exchange is open for the transaction of business. 
53. Dealings on Floor--Securities 
54. Dealings on Floor--Persons 
55. unit of trading--Stocks and Bonds 
56. unit of trading--Rights 
Auction Market--Bids and Offers 
60. 
6l. 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
70. 
7l. 
72. 
73. 
Dissemination of quotation 
Recognized quotations 
variations 
"When issued"--"when distributed" 
Bonds, rights and 100-share unit stocks 
Less than 100-share unit stocks 
u.S. Government Securities 
Below best bid-Above best offer 
Precedence of highest bid and lowest offer 
Priority and precedence of bids and offers 
"Seller's option" 
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74. Publicity of bids and offers 
A claim by a member who states that he had on the Floor 
a prior or better bid or offer shall not be sustained 
if the bid or offer was not made with the publicity and 
frequency necessary to make the existence of such bid 
or offer generally known at the time of the 
transaction. 
75. Disputes as to Bids and Offers 
76. "Crossing" orders 
77. Prohibited Dealings and Activities 
1) to buy or sell securities "on stop" above or below 
the market 
2) to buy or sell securities "at the close" 
3) to buy or sell dividends 
4) to bet upon the course of the market 
5) to buy or sell privileges to receive or deliver 
securities 
78. Sell and buy orders coupled at same price 
79. Bids and offers--Binding 
Members Dealing for Their Own Account 
90. Dealings by members on the Exchange 
91. Taking or supplying securities named in order 
92. Limitation on members' trading because of customers' orders 
1) no member shall buy or sell any security for his own 
account with the knowledge that his member organization 
holds an unexecuted market order to buy or sell that 
security 
2) no member shall buy or sell any security below or 
above the price at which he or his member organization 
holds an unexecuted limited price order to buy or sell 
such security 
93. Trading for joint account 
94. Specialists' or odd-lot dealers' interest in joint-accounts 
95. Discretionary transactions 
96. Limitation on members' trading because of options 
97. Limitation on members' trading because of block trading 
98. Restrictions on persons affiliated with specialist and odd-
lot dealer member organizations 
The above is a list of various sections throughout the New York 
stock Exchange Constitution and Rules that are related to the 
paper or the investigation in Chicago. 
--
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APPENDIX 4 
TRADING VOLUME AND GROWTH 
Commodity: Futures Trading NYSE 
thousands of contracts millions of shares 
Year Total Financial Currencies Total Volume 
Instruments 
1974 27,733 241 
1975 32,200 20 228 
1976 36,876 239 198 
1977 42,847 780 586 
1978 58,462 2,325 1,561 
1979 75,966 5,607 2,222 
1980 82,691 10,213 3,719 
1981 101,124 20,091 5,398 
1982 107,644 31,251 8,284 
1983 136,077 40,155 11,398 
1984 148,822 51,003 16,661 
1985 152,590 72,127 16,377 
1986 183,098 96,887 19,061 
Growth Rates 
Mean 0.16024 0.60048 0.45671 
st. Dev. 0.09386 0.34973 0.33876 
Maximum 0.31074 1.18283 1.08505 
Minimum 0.02500 0.23913 -0.01719 
Covariance 
TC,TC 0.0079288 
TC,CUR 0.0109345 
TC,FI 0.0142457 
TC,NV 0.0001764 
CUR, CUR 0.1032875 
CUR,FI 0.0881599 
CUR,NV -0.0061394 
FI,FI 0.1100828 
FI,NV -0.0115429 
NV,NV 0.0147904 
TC 
CUR 
FI 
NV 
= 
= 
= 
Total Commodity Volume 
Currency Futures 
Financial Instruments 
Total NYSE Volume 
3,661 
4,839 
5,519 
5,419 
7,371 
8,336 
11,562 
12,049 
16,669 
21,846 
23,309 
27,774 
36,009 
0.18755 
0.12819 
0.32714 
-0.01828 
Correlation 
1.0000000 
0.3820942 
0.4821945 
0.0162924 
1.0000000 
0.8267753 
-0.1570765 
1.0000000 
-0.2860658 
1.0000000 
Source: Statistical Abstract Of The united states. 
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VOLUME Of' TRADE 
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